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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From 1953 to 1969, Chief Justice Earl Warren led the U.S. Supreme 
Court in a liberal revolution by expanding the rights of criminal defendants 
and nationalizing nearly all of the Bill of Rights upon the states.
1
  In re-
sponse to the liberal rulings of the Warren Court, Richard Nixon‘s 1968 
presidential campaign focused upon how he would appoint conservative 
  
 * Associate Professor of Political Science, Frostburg State University; Ph.D., Kent State Universi-
ty (1998); M.A., University of Akron (1990); B.A., Youngstown State University (1987). 
 1. See THOMAS G. WALKER & LEE EPSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: AN 
INTRODUCTION 19 (1993).  Walker and Epstein, two scholars with expertise concerning the Court, 
stated that Chief Justice Warren ―presided over what can only be described as a constitutional revolu-
tion, generated by a group of justices who were perhaps the most liberal in American history.‖  See 
generally RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (1981). 
File: 01 Johnson, pg. 1 - v7i1.doc Created on:  11/25/2008 10:41:00 PM Last Printed: 12/23/2008 6:14:00 PM 
2 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 7, No. 1   
justices to the Supreme Court.
2
  During Nixon‘s first term as president, he 
appointed Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1969 to replace Earl Warren, and 
he subsequently appointed Harry Blackmun in 1970 and William Rehn-
quist and Lewis Powell in 1972.
3
   
Nixon‘s four appointments during his first term, which constituted 
nearly half of the Supreme Court, began an attempt at a conservative coun-
terrevolution.
4
  The conservative counterrevolution would seem to have 
been solidified by the fact that Nixon and his Republican presidential suc-
cessors, Ford, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush, appointed eleven Supreme 
Court justices from 1969 to 1991 without a Democratic president making a 
single appointment.
5
  However, because appointments to the Court are 
unpredictable, more than a few of the eleven appointments emerged as 
moderate or liberal justices.
6
   
Conservatives were still attempting to realize a counterrevolution when 
David Souter was chosen to replace Justice William Brennan, one of the 
most liberal justices who had ever served on the Court.
7
  On July 25, 1990, 
President George H. W. Bush nominated David Souter at the request of 
two conservative Republicans from New Hampshire, U.S. Senator Warren 
Rudman and former governor John Sununu, who was serving as White 




 2. THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET AL., THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES 6 (1997).  Nixon argued that the liberal decisions of the Warren Court ―had resulted in a 
breakdown of law and order in American society . . . .‖  Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.; see generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN‘T (Vincent 
Blasi ed., 1983). 
 5. The eleven appointments, in chronological order, were Chief Justice Warren Burger (1969), 
Associate Justice Harry Blackmun (1970), Associate Justice Lewis Powell (1972), Associate Justice 
William Rehnquist (1972), Associate Justice John Paul Stevens (1975), Associate Justice Sandra Day 
O‘Connor (1981), Chief Justice William Rehnquist (1986), Associate Justice Antonin Scalia (1986), 
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy (1988), Associate Justice David Souter (1990), and Associate 
Justice Clarence Thomas (1991).  LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A 
CHANGING AMERICA 70410 (2007).  Jimmy Carter, the only Democrat serving as president between 
1969 and 1992, did not have an opportunity to appoint a justice to the Supreme Court.  LAWRENCE 
BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 182 (9th ed. 2006). 
 6. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 67.  The conservative counterrevolution was stymied by the 
appointments of Justices Harry Blackmun and Lewis Powell by President Richard Nixon.  Id.  Black-
mun became liberal in his behavior by the 1980s and Powell became somewhat of a moderate, shifting 
back and forth between the liberal and conservative blocs.  Id.  President Gerald Ford‘s appointment of 
Justice John Paul Stevens in 1975 yielded the most liberal justice currently serving on the Court.  Id. at 
7.  President Ronald Reagan‘s appointment of Sandra Day O‘Connor in 1981 produced a moderately 
conservative vote at best.  Id.  Reagan‘s fourth and final appointment to the Court was hampered by the 
Iran-Contra scandal in 1986 as well as two failed attempts to replace Justice Lewis Powell, with Robert 
Bork and Douglas Ginsburg.  Id. at 811.  Hence, the broader political context forced Reagan to nomi-
nate Justice Anthony Kennedy in 1988, who has proven to be a moderate on the Court.  Id. at 11. 
 7. Id. at 75. 
 8. TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, DAVID HACKETT SOUTER: TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN ON THE 
REHNQUIST COURT 10206 (2005). 
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Since his appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Souter has 
proven to be anything but an ideological appointment.
9
  While Justice Sou-
ter did align more often with conservative justices during his early years on 
the Court, he has shifted recently toward the liberal bloc of justices, name-
ly Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and John Paul Stevens.
10
  
Even in criminal justice cases, an area where Justice Souter displayed con-
servative ideals during his earlier years with a bias toward the govern-
ment‘s position, it is important to recognize that he has not behaved as an 
ideological conservative.
11
  In fact, during his last ten years on the Court, 
Justice Souter has shown a tendency to rule in favor of criminal defen-
dants‘ rights, frequently disappointing right-wing groups.12  Justice Souter 
has rejected the original intent theory of constitutional interpretation co-
veted by ideological conservatives in favor of a more practical and flexible 
application of precedent and interpretation of the law.
13
 
The following article documents the judicial career of Justice David 
Souter from his time served as an attorney general and state judge in New 
Hampshire until his recent tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court.
14
  Based 
upon his written opinions and individual votes, Justice Souter clearly has 
evolved into a more liberal jurist than ideological conservatives would 
have preferred in the area of criminal justice.
15
  Over the course of his judi-
cial career, Justice Souter has gained respect as an intellectual scholar by 
attempting to completely understand both sides of a dispute and applying 
precedent and legal rules in a flexible—albeit technical—manner in the 
hope of achieving justice.
16
  However, Justice Souter may be remembered 
most as the justice who disappointed ideological conservatives by failing to 
complete a conservative counterrevolution that had begun with President 
Richard Nixon‘s first appointment to the Court in 1969. 
  
 9. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 7677. 
 10. Robert H. Smith, Justice Souter Joins the Rehnquist Court: An Empirical Study of Supreme 
Court Voting Patterns, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 11, 1213 (1992); see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).  Segal 
and Spaeth argue that attitudes and values are the most important factors in explaining judicial beha-
vior.  Id.  The attitudinal model simply divides the behavior of justices into either liberal or conserva-
tive votes.  HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 1819.  For the purposes of this article, a liberal decision 
is a ruling that supports the rights of the individual, such as a vote in favor of a criminal suspect who 
has alleged that his or her rights were violated by the government.  Conversely, a conservative decision 
is a ruling in favor of the government, such as a vote in favor of police officers who have claimed not 
to have violated the rights of a criminal defendant. 
 11. See YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 185. 
 12. Id. at 22123. 
 13. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 77. 
 14. See generally YARBROUGH, supra note 8. 
 15. BAUM, supra note 5, at 12224. 
 16. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 198. 
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II.  SOUTER AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
From 1976 to 1978, David Souter served as attorney general for the 
State of New Hampshire.
17
  In his role as attorney general, Souter issued 
opinions related to criminal law involving state and local law enforcement 
agencies.
18
  During this time period, most of the opinions issued by Souter 
lacked controversy and usually involved technical issues of law.
19
  Howev-
er, in December of 1976, Souter did comment publicly on a divisive case 
involving a convicted murderer from Concord, New Hampshire.
20
  The 
murder conviction of Gary S. Farrow was based largely on witnesses who 
had made deals with prosecutors in exchange for their testimony.
21
  A New 
Hampshire newspaper—the Concord Monitor—had published an article 
praising the public defenders provided to Farrow but criticizing the prose-
cution for trading criminal charges for testimony.
22
  Souter responded by 
authoring a guest column in the Concord Monitor where he praised the 
legal defense but also stressed that, in the interests of justice, the prosecu-
tors were obligated to conduct a thorough investigation and present the 
best evidence of Farrow‘s guilt.23  According to Souter, the Concord police 
and prosecutors deserved respect, and justice had been served in the mur-
der case.
24
  Souter ended the guest column by expressing support for the 
prosecuting attorney‘s decision to drop criminal charges in exchange for 
witness testimony in the murder trial.
25
  This guest column provided evi-
dence of Souter‘s conservatism in criminal procedure cases during his brief 
stint as attorney general in and also began a pattern of Souter consistently 




Souter‘s conservatism was also evident in his support of the death pe-
nalty during his years as attorney general of New Hampshire.
27
  After the 
U.S. Supreme Court re-legalized the use of capital punishment in Gregg v. 
Georgia, Souter provided testimony before the New Hampshire House of 
Representatives where he stated that a life sentence in prison was not a 
  
 17. Id. at 20; Linda Greenhouse, An „Intellectual Mind‟: David Hackett Souter, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
1990, at A1. 
 18. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 29. 
 19. Neil A. Lewis, Combing the Past for Clues on Souter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990, at 128. 
 20. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 29. 
 21. Id. at 2931; see also State v. Farrow, 386 A.2d 808, 810 (N.H. 1978). 
 22. See YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 29. 
 23. Id. at 30. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 22. 
 27. Id. at 36. 
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suitable punishment for the capital offense of murder in the first degree.
28
  
Souter‘s argument in favor of capital punishment was based largely upon 
his belief that the death penalty would deter individuals from committing 
murders.
29
  New Hampshire ultimately did reinstate the use of the death 




III.  ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ON THE STATE SUPERIOR COURT 
As an associate justice on the New Hampshire Superior Court from 
1978 to 1983, Souter had a reputation of issuing tough sentences for crimi-
nal convicts.
31
  Souter showed his tendency toward harsh sentencing in a 
1981 case where he rejected a plea bargain attempt by defense lawyers and 
prosecutors who had reduced a lenient sentence for felony conviction.
32
  In 
overturning the plea bargain of probation for a female defendant who had 
stolen a .357 Magnum revolver, Souter ordered the defendant to serve nine 
months in prison and chastised prosecutors for accepting the deal.
33
 
Although Souter was tough as a trial judge, he respected precedent ex-
panding criminal defendants‘ rights and was even known to show sympa-
thy, at times, for defendants.
34
  For example, he once refused a plea bargain 
accepted by a defendant who had agreed to serve two years in prison for 
stealing one dollar.
35
  Souter stated that ―it was cruel and inhumane to sen-
tence someone to two years for stealing a dollar.‖36  Hence, Souter was 




Although Souter was viewed as conservative because he supported po-
lice and prosecutors in criminal cases, he would exclude evidence if it had 
been illegally seized or if it was the result of a coerced confession.
38
  Col-
leagues emphasized that Souter was most interested in producing a fair 
  
 28. 428 U.S. 227 (1976); YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 36. 
 29. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 29. 
 30. Id.  A jury recently voted to impose the death penalty in State v. Addison, No. 07-S-0254 (N.H. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2008).  Katie Zezima, Jury Issues First Death Penalty in New Hampshire Since the 
1950s, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A29.  In 1959, two convicts were sentenced to death in New 
Hampshire, but their sentences were invalidated based on a 1972 U.S. Supreme Court ruling.  Id. 
 31. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 5359. 
 32. Id. at 59. 
 33. Id.; see also David J. Garrow, Justice Souter Emerges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at 41. 
 34. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 55; see also Ruth Marcus, Souter: Conservative Mindset, Careful 
Jurist, WASH. POST, July 25, 1990, at A6. 
 35. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 55. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 54. 
 38. Marcus, supra note 34, at A6. 
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trial and was not a judge who blindly supported the state.
39
  In one particu-
lar case, Souter ruled much of the evidence inadmissible because police 
had gone beyond the orders in the search warrant when collecting evi-
dence, even though the case involved a career burglar who possessed a 
stockpile of stolen goods in his home.
40
  In addition, Souter was angered by 
police who had not only gone beyond the search warrant but had allowed 
the media into the defendant‘s home to broadcast a news story praising the 
police department for fighting crime in the area.
41
  In another case involv-
ing alleged arson and second-degree murder, Souter excluded evidence 
when it was revealed that police had tampered with the evidence and had 
also forced a confession from the female defendant by threatening to take 
away her child if she did not cooperate in the investigation.
42
 
IV.  NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
Souter served as an associate justice of the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court from 1983 to 1990.
43
  During his seven years on the state supreme 
court, he was known for respecting precedent and interpreting the language 
of the law and the original intention of the framers in a technical manner.
44
  
Justice Souter‘s written opinions mainly involved statutory interpretation, 
in areas such as criminal procedure, family law, and negligence.
45
  On 
criminal justice issues, Justice Souter was generally regarded as a conserv-
ative judge who consistently voted against the rights of criminal defen-
dants.
46
  A summary of Justice Souter‘s voting record while on the state 
supreme court revealed only nine votes in favor of criminal defendants‘ 
rights out of a total of eighty-two votes, roughly 11% in the liberal direc-
tion.
47
  Although Justice Souter was largely viewed as a traditional con-
servative, he eventually developed a flexible interpretation of constitution-
al law and came to be respected by both Democrats and Republicans in 
New Hampshire as a judge who always ruled in the interests of promoting 




 39. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 55. 
 40. Id. at 56. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Greenhouse, supra note 17, at A1. 
 44. William S. Jordan, III, Justice David Souter and Statutory Interpretation, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 
491, 493 (1992); Marcus, supra note 34, at A6. 
 45. Greenhouse, supra note 17, at A1. 
 46. Ann Devroy, President Selects Souter, 50, for „Intellect‟ and „Ability,‟ WASH. POST, July 24, 
1990, at A1. 
 47. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 92. 
 48. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 76. 
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New Hampshire‘s highest court provided notoriety for Justice Souter 
in only a limited number of criminal justice cases of constitutional impor-
tance, such as the case of State v. Koppel.
49
  In Koppel, Justice Souter 
wrote a dissenting opinion in which a majority of the court had struck 
down sobriety checkpoints as a violation of the Fourth Amendment‘s 
search-and-seizure clause.
50
  Scholars have speculated that Justice Souter 
was anticipating a conservative trend on the U.S. Supreme Court at this 
time because the Court eventually upheld sobriety checkpoints five years 
later in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.
51
  Justice Souter also 
wrote a majority opinion where he supported a state law that allowed po-
lice to employ a mechanical device capable of detecting information from 
a telephone.
52
  In writing for the state supreme court, Justice Souter main-
tained that the use of the device by police did not constitute a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
53
 
In regard to Miranda rights and the privilege against self-
incrimination, Justice Souter apparently was reluctant to favor criminal 
defendants.
54
  In State v. Denney,
55
 Justice Souter dissented when the ma-
jority held that the refusal of a defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test 
could not be admitted by prosecutors.
56
  The majority reasoned that the 
defendant‘s refusal was inadmissible because police had not warned the 
defendant that such a refusal could be used against him at trial.
57
  In his 
dissent, Justice Souter argued that the police officers had issued the Miran-
da warnings to the defendant, and that these warnings implied that the re-
fusal to submit to the test could be used against him in court.
58
  Interesting-
ly, Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in a previous case involving a 
prosecutor who used a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test as evidence 
of the defendant‘s guilt.59  Justice Souter maintained that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to physical 
evidence, but only to testimonial evidence.
60
 
In Coppola v. State,
61
 Justice Souter continued his conservative beha-
vior in Miranda cases when he allowed a defiant statement made by a de-
  
 49. 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985). 
 50. Id. at 983 (Souter, J., dissenting); Garrow, supra note 33, at 645. 
 51. 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990); see also YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 86. 
 52. State v. Valenzuela, 536 A.2d 1252, 126162 (N.H. 1987); YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 86. 
 53. Valenzuela, 536 A.2d at 126162. 
 54. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 91. 
 55. 536 A.2d 1242 (N.H. 1987). 
 56. Id. at 1245 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. (majority opinion); Jordan, supra note 44, at 512. 
 58. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 88 (citing State v. Denney, 536 A.2d 1242, 1246 (N.H. 1987)). 
 59. Id. (citing State v. Cormier, 499 A.2d 986 (N.H. 1985)). 
 60. Id. at 8889. 
 61. 536 A.2d 1236 (N.H. 1987). 
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fendant to be introduced at trial.
62
  In Coppola, Vincent Coppola had 
bragged to police that they could not get him to confess to the rape of an 
elderly woman.
63
  In writing the unanimous opinion for the state supreme 
court, Justice Souter concluded that Coppola‘s statement was not within 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment‘s privilege against self-
incrimination and that it could be used by the prosecution to establish Cop-
pola‘s guilt.64 
Finally, Justice Souter caused some controversy in a case where he de-
cided against a rape victim based upon his respect for precedent.
65
  In Col-
bath,
66
 Justice Souter wrote for a unanimous court in holding that the pub-
lic behavior of the rape victim prior to an alleged sexual assault should 
have been admitted as evidence by the trial judge because such behavior 
was relevant to the issue of consent.
67
  Justice Souter noted that evidence 
existed of the victim engaging in public behavior where she directed ―sex-
ually provocative attention‖ toward a number of male patrons in a tavern, 
including the defendant.
68
  Moreover, Justice Souter cited to precedent 
from State v. Howard
69
 that allowed defendants the right to confront ac-
cusers, even though a rape-shield law appeared to ban the admission of 
prior sexual behavior between the victim and persons other than the defen-
dant.
70
  Justice Souter concluded that, while the sexual history of a rape 
victim generally was to be withheld from a jury, the rape-shield law was 
not absolute based upon precedent established in Howard.
71
 
The Coppola and Colbath decisions became an issue when President 
George H. W. Bush nominated Justice Souter to the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals for a very brief stint in 1990.
72
  In particular, Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy raised concerns about Justice Souter‘s opinions in Coppola and 
Colbath during the Senate confirmation hearings.
73
  Despite Senator Ken-
nedy‘s concerns, the Senate confirmed Justice Souter‘s appointment to the 
First Circuit by unanimous vote.
74
  After serving only a few months on the 
  
 62. Id. at 1239; YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 90. 
 63. Coppola, 536 A.2d at 1239. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See State v. Colbath, 540 A.2d 1212, 1217 (N.H. 1988). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 426 A.2d 457 (N.H. 1981). 
 70. Colbath, 540 A.2d at 1216; Howard, 426 A.2d at 462. 
 71. Greenhouse, supra note 17, at A1. 
 72. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 9698. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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First Circuit Court of Appeals and participating in only one decision,
75
 
Justice Souter was selected by President George H. W. Bush to replace 
Justice William Brennan, who was retiring from the U.S. Supreme Court at 
the age of eighty-four.
76
 
During Senate confirmation hearings, Justice Souter offered what was 
perhaps the first hint that he was not an ideological conservative by endors-
ing a limited right to privacy and speaking respectfully about the liberal 
decisions of the Warren Court, which had expanded the rights of criminal 
defendants.
77
  Moreover, Souter praised Justice Brennan, the ultra-liberal 
whom he was replacing, as one of the greatest protectors of the Bill of 
Rights.
78
  Justice Souter‘s performance during the confirmation hearings 
allowed the Senators to view him as a moderate.
79
  Justice Souter also be-
nefited from the fact that, prior to his appointment to the Court, he had not 
published anything about his legal views and refused to make public 
speeches about his own judicial philosophy.
80
  Hence, he was able to ap-
pear as a ―stealth‖ candidate for the U.S. Supreme Court and was con-
firmed in the U.S. Senate by a vote of ninety to nine.
81
 
V.  U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICE SOUTER AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES 
A. The Policy Impact of a Freshman Justice 
In the area of criminal justice, Justice David Souter immediately had 
an impact during his first year on the U.S. Supreme Court.
82
  During his 
first term, Justice Souter provided the decisive vote in seven different five-
to-four decisions where the Court established new ―conservative‖ prece-
  
 75. United States v. Waldeck, 909 F.2d 555 (1st Cir. 1990).  In Waldeck, Souter joined a unanimous 
three judge panel in upholding an indictment and conviction of the defendant on five counts of tax 
evasion.  Id. at 558.  Souter heard oral arguments in several other cases but did not take part in the 
opinions.  YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 9698.  Hence, the Waldeck decision was the only case that 
Souter formally ruled upon during his very brief tenure on the First Circuit.  Id. 
 76. David S. Broder & Helen Dewar, Bush Opens Drive for Court Nominee: Confirmation Hearings 
Set for September, WASH. POST, July 25, 1990, at A1. 
 77. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 76. 
 78. Id.; see also Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Newcomer on the High Court: Justice 
Souter and the Supreme Court‟s 1990 Term, 37 S.D. L. REV. 21, 24 (1992); Linda Greenhouse, Filling 
In the Blanks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1990, at 111. 
 79. Greenhouse, supra note 17, at A1. 
 80. Id.  Unlike Robert Bork, Souter did not have a paper trail of legal views that could harm him 
during the Senate confirmation hearings.  Id.  Souter‘s only publication was a law review article which 
consisted of a tribute to Justice Laurence Ilsley Duncan, who had served on the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court from 1946 to 1976.  See David H. Souter, Mr. Justice Duncan, 24 N.H.B.J. 81, 83 (1983). 
 81. See YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 14344. 
 82. See generally Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, David Souter‟s First Term on the Su-
preme Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75 JUDICATURE 238 (1992). 
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dents that limited the rights of criminal defendants.
83
  Justice Brennan most 
likely would have voted in favor of the rights of the criminal suspects had 
these cases been argued the previous term.
84
  Hence, Justice Souter‘s im-
pact during the 1990–1991 term served to have broad policy implications 
in the area of criminal justice.
85
   
In Arizona v. Fulminante,
86
 Justice Souter cast the decisive vote to al-
low coerced confessions as harmless error, and, in County of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin,
87
 Justice Souter also provided the swing vote to allow persons 
placed under arrest to be held for as long as forty-eight hours before prob-
able cause had to be determined by a magistrate.
88
 
In regard to prisoners‘ rights, Justice Souter voted with the conserva-
tive bloc to make it more difficult for prisoners to challenge their condi-
tions of confinement, and to provide states the power to mandate life sen-
tences for drug convictions without the possibility of parole.
89
  Finally, 
Justice Souter voted against the rights of criminal suspects in three cases 
involving jury selection and jury instructions.
90
  
It should be noted that on a few occasions Justice Souter did break 
with the conservative justices, such as in his majority opinion in Yates v. 
Evatt,
91
 which held that the harmless error doctrine did not extend to jury 
instructions.
92
  Hence, even in his first term, Justice Souter‘s behavior 




Overall, Justice Souter proved to be a decisive vote for the conserva-
tive bloc, but it should be added that he did not author any ―important‖ 
opinions during his first year on the Court.
94
  In fact, he authored an ex-
  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
 87. 500 U.S. 44 (1991). 
 88. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 30203; McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 5859; see also Smith, supra note 10, 
at 4041. 
 89. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (requiring individual sentencing in capital 
punishment cases only); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (applying a ―deliberate indiffe-
rence‖ standard instead of a ―wanton‖ standard to prison officials‘ behavior in cases relating to prison 
conditions). 
 90. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 933 (1991) (holding that a U.S. magistrate may con-
duct voir dire for felony juries when defendants consent despite an absence of statutory authority); 
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 645 (1991) (finding no error where trial judge failed to instruct the 
jury on lesser-included offenses); Mu‘Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 43132 (1991) (finding no error 
when judge failed to question jurors about their knowledge of news reports concerning a case). 
 91. 500 U.S. 393 (1991), overruled by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 73 n.4 (1991). 
 92. Yates, 500 U.S. at 402. 
 93. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 166. 
 94. Johnson, supra note 82, at 242 tbl.2. 
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tremely low number of opinions relative to his colleagues.
95
  Justice Souter 
wrote only twelve opinions—eight majority opinions, two concurring opi-
nions, and two dissenting opinions—during his first term.96  No other jus-
tice authored fewer than twenty-one opinions during the 1990–1991 term.97   
Interestingly, Justice Souter‘s first year saw the Court undergo severe 
gridlock at the end of the term.
98
  A former clerk attributed the gridlock to 
a ―breakdown in one chamber‖ and speculated that Justice Souter‘s refusal 
to utilize a word-processor and his insistence upon composing his own 
opinions, rather than relying upon drafts from his law clerks, had caused 
the backlog.
99
  In fact, after his first year, Justice Souter described the 
Court‘s workload to The Boston Globe by stating that it was as if he had 
―walk[ed] through a tidal wave.‖100 
B. Search and Seizure Cases 
In search and seizure cases, Justice Souter joined the conservative bloc 
during his initial years by favoring the government‘s position, but, more 
recently, he has exhibited a pattern of voting with the liberal justices and 
defending the rights of criminal defendants.
101
  An examination of Justice 
Souter‘s behavior demonstrates such a conservative trend in his early years 
but also reveals a willingness to separate from the conservative bloc and 
rely upon a flexible and pragmatic approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion.
102
  In short, unlike Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Antonin 
Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Souter has been prone to 
place constraints on the amount of discretion given to police officers in 
searching for and seizing evidence.
103
  
During the 2000–2001 term, Justice Souter authored a majority opi-
nion in a search-and-seizure case, which proved to be one of his more con-
troversial opinions.
104
  In writing for the five-justice majority in Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, Justice Souter led a majority comprised of conservative 
justices—namely Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
  
 95. Id. 
 96. Smith, supra note 10, at 21. 
 97. Johnson, supra note 82, at 241. 
 98. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 160. 
 99. Id.; Ned Zeman & Lucy Howard, Souter: Slow Off the Mark, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 1991, at 4. 
 100. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 160. 
 101. Id. at 234. 
 102. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 7677. 
 103. Id. at 449 tbl.9.2.  Even during his initial terms on the Court from 1991 to 1994, where Souter 
voted more conservatively than in later terms, Souter voted conservatively in 64% of the search and 
seizure cases, while the conservative votes of Thomas (67%), Scalia (74%), and Rehnquist (90%) were 
more restrictive of Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. 
 104. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 234. 
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Kennedy—in holding that a warrantless arrest by police for a misdemeanor 
seat belt violation was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
105
  The 
controversy in the Atwater case involved the arrest of Gail Atwater for 
failing to secure her two small children with seat belts in the front seat of 
her pickup truck.
106
  Texas law prohibited passengers, particularly small 
children, from riding in the front seat without seat belts.
107
  The Texas sta-
tute authorized police to arrest Atwater and charge her with a misdemea-




Atwater‘s attorney argued that, when the Constitution was drafted, au-
thorities prohibited warrantless arrests under common-law for misdemea-
nor offenses, unless someone had committed a violent act or disturbed the 
peace.
109
  Justice Souter‘s majority opinion conceded that there was some 
substance to the argument presented by Atwater‘s counsel, but ultimately it 
failed because a close examination of English common law revealed that 
police were authorized to arrest persons for night-walking and negligent 
carriage driving without a warrant.
110
  In short, the common-law rules that 
existed prior to the drafting of the Constitution and the subsequent devel-
opment of American law did not support Atwater‘s position.111  Justice 
Souter concluded that police may arrest an individual without a warrant if 
there is ―probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a 
very minor criminal offense in [the officer‘s] presence.‖112 
Two years after Atwater, Justice Souter wrote for a unanimous Court 
in a Fourth Amendment case concerning whether police officers may ex-
ecute a search warrant by knocking on a suspect‘s door and waiting fifteen 
to twenty seconds before entering the home by way of force.
113
  In United 
States v. Banks, FBI agents and North Las Vegas police obtained a warrant 
to search for cocaine in the apartment of Lashawn Lowell Banks.
114
  After 
police officers knocked on Banks‘s apartment door loudly and shouted, 
―Police search warrant,‖ the officers waited fifteen to twenty seconds and 
then broke the door down with a battering ram.
115
  Banks contended that he 
was in the shower and did not hear the knock on the door or the officers 
  
 105. 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
 106. Id. at 32324. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 327. 
 110. Id. at 33334. 
 111. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 23435. 
 112. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354. 
 113. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35 (2003). 
 114. Id. at 33. 
 115. Id. 
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announcing their presence.
116
  Police officials seized crack-cocaine, wea-
pons, and other evidence of drug dealing at Banks‘s residence which 
Banks‘s legal counsel sought to suppress at trial.117 
Justice Souter‘s unanimous opinion concluded that the forcible entry 
by law enforcement did not violate Banks‘s Fourth Amendment rights.118  
Justice Souter‘s opinion concluded that law enforcement officials acted 
sensibly in assuming that fifteen to twenty seconds was enough time for 
Banks to destroy the evidence.
119
  Justice Souter reasoned that when police 
officers are in the process of searching and seizing evidence, the situation 
must be analyzed in light of exigent circumstances.
120
  In Banks, the police 
officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that evidence was being de-
stroyed, and, therefore, authorities were permitted to enter the residence 
forcibly without violating the search-and-seizure clause.
121
 
Justice Souter‘s third majority opinion in the area of search and seizure 
perhaps foreshadowed his recent shift toward the liberal bloc on the 
Court.
122
  In Georgia v. Randolph,
123
 the justices focused on the ―co-
occupant consent rule,‖ or whether police could search a home when one 
occupant consented to a search while another refused to consent.
124
  When 
police officers arrived at the residence of Scott and Janet Randolph in 
Americus, Georgia, in response to a domestic altercation, Janet Randolph 
indicated to police that her husband, Scott, was a cocaine user and also 
stated that he had drugs inside the home.
125
  While Janet Randolph did con-
sent to the search of the home, Scott Randolph refused to provide consent 
to allow the police to search for evidence of drug use.
126
  When the police 
officers commenced with the search and seized cocaine from the home 
which was subsequently provided to prosecutors, Scott Randolph moved to 





 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 43. 
 119. Id. at 38. 
 120. Id. at 37. 
 121. Id. at 43; see also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (holding that the knock-and-
announce principle is part of a reasonableness inquiry, but police can enter a home if officers have a 
reasonable suspicion that evidence might be destroyed); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995). 
 122. Scott Johnson, The Written Opinions and Voting Behavior of Justice David Souter in Criminal 
Justice Cases (Apr. 2627, 2008) (paper presented at the Third Annual Appalachian Spring Conference 
in World History, Criminal Justice, and Economics, on file with author). 
 123. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 124. Id. at 106. 
 125. Id. at 107. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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In Randolph, Justice Souter wrote for the five-vote majority, which al-
so included Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kennedy.  Justice Sou-
ter‘s majority opinion held that even if a co-occupant consented to the 
search by police, the other co-occupant could refuse consent if he or she 
was physically present at the time of the search.
128
  Justice Souter con-
cluded that the search and seizure of the drug evidence by police must be 
considered unreasonable without a warrant where a co-occupant of a resi-
dence refused to consent to the search.
129
  Justice Souter‘s majority opinion 
in Randolph appeared to contradict precedent established by the Court in 
Illinois v. Rodriguez and United States v. Matlock,
130
 where the Court had 
held that co-occupant consent did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights 
of the other co-occupant of a residence; however, Justice Souter‘s majority 
opinion drew a distinction between the facts in Randolph and the estab-
lished case precedent by asserting that the co-occupants refusing the 
searches in Rodriguez and Matlock were not physically present when the 
police were searching for evidence.
131
 
Finally, Justice Souter‘s most recent search and seizure opinion was 
written for a unanimous Court in Brendlin v. California.
132
  In Brendlin, 
police officers stopped a vehicle to check for registration without any rea-
son to believe that the vehicle had broken any traffic laws.
133
  One of the 
officers noticed that a passenger in the vehicle, Bruce Brendlin, was a pa-
role violator, and he was subsequently arrested and searched.
134
  The 
search of Brendlin produced drugs and drug paraphernalia which Brendlin 
later attempted to have suppressed based on the police officers‘ lack of 
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
135
 
In his unanimous opinion for the Court, Justice Souter ruled that a pas-
senger may challenge the constitutionality of a traffic stop because he was 
considered to be seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.
136
  Relying upon 
precedent established in Florida v. Bostick,
137
 Justice Souter concluded that 
the seizure of an individual by police has occurred when a reasonable per-
son would not feel free to terminate the encounter with the police.
138
  The 
passenger, similar to the driver of the vehicle, had his freedom limited by 
  
 128. Id. at 107. 
 129. Id. at 104. 
 130. Id. at 121; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 18889 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 
U.S. 164, 17778 (1974). 
 131. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106. 
 132. 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007). 
 133. Id. at 2404. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 2403. 
 137. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 138. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 240506. 
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police and had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
139
  Therefore, the passenger did have a right to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the search conducted by police officers.
140
 
While the Brendlin opinion can be viewed as a liberal ruling, it should 
be recognized that all of the nine justices agreed with Justice Souter‘s opi-
nion and, therefore, the decision was not ideologically divisive.
141
  In fact, 
the Brendlin ruling was technical in nature because the justices simply held 
that Brendlin, as a passenger, could attempt to suppress the evidence ga-
thered by the police officers.
142
  Justice Souter‘s opinion deferred to the 
state court to decide the more controversial issue of whether the evidence 
actually should be suppressed.
143
 
As with Justice Souter‘s authorship of Court opinions, his votes cast in 
important cases as well as his concurring and dissenting opinions have 
illustrated his flexibility and independence in judicial decisionmaking and 
have revealed a recent trend toward favoring criminal defendants.
144
  Jus-
tice Souter cast two important votes during his early years on the Court 
that suggested he would join with ideological conservatives in search and 
seizure cases.  First, during his freshman term, Justice Souter joined a con-
servative majority in Florida v. Bostick,
145
 where the Court held that the 
Florida Supreme Court had applied an incorrect legal analysis in holding 
that the questioning of bus passengers by police had constituted an unrea-
sonable search and seizure of drug evidence.
146
  Second, in Arizona v. 
Evans,
147
 Justice Souter also voted with the conservative majority to extend 
the ―good faith‖ exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where a com-
puter error causes an illegal search and seizure of evidence.  In Evans, 
however, Justice Souter expressed concern in a separate concurrence that it 
might be necessary to apply the exclusionary rule against other govern-
mental employees, rather than simply police officers, to deter false arrests 




 139. Id. at 240607. 
 140. Id. at 2410. 
 141. Id. at 2403. 
 142. Id. at 2410. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 18586. 
 145. 501 U.S. 429, 43140 (1991). 
 146. Id. at 437.  In Bostick, the Florida State Supreme Court relied on Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 
U.S. 567 (1988), in holding that a passenger on a bus had his search and seizure rights violated because 
he was ―not free to leave‖ when approached by police.  Id.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
manded the case back to the Florida court based on the fact that the passenger was ―not free to leave‖ 
because the bus was departing, not because of police coercion.  Id. at 43738.  The Florida court could 
not simply rule in favor of the defendant without understanding the context of the encounter between 
Bostick and the police.  Id. 
 147. 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 148. Id. at 18 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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More recently, Justice Souter has shown a penchant for siding with the 
liberal bloc in search and seizure rulings.  For instance, Justice Souter dis-
sented from the conservative majority opinion in United States v. Dray-
ton,
149
 where the Court had decided a case almost identical to Bostick in-
volving the pat down of bus passengers by police.
150
  Justice Souter argued 
in his dissenting opinion that the pat down by police was not a consensual 
exercise because the passengers were given every indication by police that 
they were not free to refuse the search.
151
  In Illinois v. Caballes,
152
 Justice 
Souter also dissented from the conservative majority which held that the 
search of an automobile trunk by a drug-sniffing police dog was constitu-
tionally valid.
153
  Finally, in Hudson v. Michigan,
154
 Justice Souter voted 
against five conservative justices and joined a dissent written by Justice 
Breyer in a case very similar to Banks.
155
  In Hudson, the majority held 
that, while police had violated the ―knock and announce‖ rule by waiting 
only three to five seconds before entering a private residence to search for 
drug evidence with a warrant, the violation did not require the suppression 
of evidence discovered in the search.
156
  According to the ―knock and an-
nounce‖ rule, police are required to wait a reasonable amount of time after 
knocking on the door and announcing their presence before entering a 
home with a search warrant.
157
  The fact that Justice Souter voted different-
ly in the similar cases discussed above suggests that his behavior has not 
been driven by ideology, but rather the flexible application and interpreta-
tion of the law based upon the circumstances at hand.
158
 
In other areas of search and seizure, Justice Souter also seemed to be 
applying a flexible approach in his decisionmaking process.
159
  For exam-
ple, even though Justice Souter endorsed sobriety checkpoints while serv-
ing as a justice on the New Hampshire Supreme Court, he voted to strike 
down a police roadblock designed to arrest drug traffickers in City of Indi-
anapolis v. Edmond.
160
  He also joined a concurring and dissenting opinion 
  
 149. 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 150. Id. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 152. 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 153. Id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 154. 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 155. Id. at 605 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003). 
 156. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599. 
 157. Id. at 589.  Since Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917, the knock-and-announce rule has 
been part of federal statutory law.  18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2006).  See generally Sabbath v. United States, 
391 U.S. 585 (1968) (applying the Espionage Act of 1917); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 
(1958) (discussing another application of the Espionage Act of 1917). 
 158. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 77. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 86 (discussing Souter‘s ruling on sobriety checkpoints); see 
generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
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written by Justice Stevens in Illinois v. Lidster, where the Court had ruled 
in favor of police officers who had stopped motorists for the purpose of 
gathering information about a crime committed in the community.
161
  Jus-
tices Stevens and Souter argued that local judges were better suited to de-
cide the constitutionality of the roadblocks based upon the local conditions 
and practices of a community.
162
  Finally, Justice Souter voted with the six-
vote liberal majority in a case where the Court held that drug testing of 
pregnant women who sought prenatal care at a hospital was an unreasona-
ble search, and also voted with the liberal bloc in another six-to-three deci-
sion where a conservative majority ruled that the drug testing of high 
school students who wanted to compete in athletics was not a violation of 
the search and seizure clause.
163
 
C. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (the Right to Remain Silent) 
and Miranda v. Arizona 
Justice Souter wrote his first opinion involving the Fifth Amendment‘s 
privilege against self-incrimination in Withrow v. Williams.
164
  In addition 
to the right to remain silent, Justice Souter‘s opinion in Withrow dealt with 
the question of whether to extend a conservative precedent from the Burger 
Court era (1969–1986) established in Stone v. Powell.165  In Stone, the 
Burger Court denied attempts by state prisoners to challenge the legality of 
a search and seizure in federal habeas proceedings if the defendant had a 
fair chance during trial and on appeal to raise such issues.
166
  The Court 
had concluded that any attempt during federal proceedings to exclude evi-
dence based upon an illegal search and seizure did not follow the intended 
purpose of the exclusionary rule, which was designed to prevent miscon-
duct by police officers.
167
 
In Withrow, Justice Souter wrote for a unanimous Court in deciding 
not to extend the rule in Stone to state convictions based upon confessions 
that may have been obtained in violation of Miranda warnings.
168
  Justice 
Souter wrote in his opinion that the defendant did have a right to federal 
habeas corpus review and that his incriminating statements should have 
been thrown out of court because the right to remain silent under the Fifth 
  
 161. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 421 (2004). 
 162. Id. at 42930. 
 163. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 8586 (2001); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646, 66465 (1995). 
 164. 507 U.S. 680 (1993). 
 165. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 68283; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
 166. Stone, 428 U.S. at 49495. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 68283. 
File: 01 Johnson, pg. 1 - v7i1.doc Created on:  11/25/2008 10:41:00 PM Last Printed: 12/23/2008 6:14:00 PM 
18 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 7, No. 1   
Amendment had been violated.
169
  The case involved questioning by the 
Michigan police of Robert Allen Williams concerning a double murder.
170
  
Williams admitted that he had provided the shooter with the weapon, but 
the police officers had not issued a Miranda warning to Williams and had 
threatened to ―lock him up‖ if he refused to talk.171  The trial court had 
refused to exclude Williams‘s incriminating statements, concluding that he 
was given his Miranda warnings in a timely fashion, and Williams was 
found guilty of first-degree murder.
172
  However, unlike in Stone, where 
the failure to exclude evidence based upon an illegal search and seizure 
was determined not to violate a fundamental trial right, Justice Souter rea-
soned that Miranda warnings needed to be recognized at the trial stage 
because the warnings prevent the use of unreliable confessions at trial.
173
 
In United States v. Balsys,
174
 Justice Souter issued another opinion 
concerning the privilege against self-incrimination in a case involving the 
U.S. government‘s investigation into the activities of a resident alien dur-
ing World War II.
175
  Aloyzas Balsys had claimed the privilege against 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment because he feared being 
prosecuted in a foreign country.
176
  Balsys was not afraid of being prose-
cuted by authorities in the United States, but he was concerned that his 
statements about his wartime activities could subject him to prosecution in 
Lithuania, Germany, or Israel.
177
  In writing for a seven-justice majority, 
Justice Souter held that Balsys‘s refusal to provide information to the U.S. 
authorities due to fear of prosecution by a foreign nation was not protected 
by the Fifth Amendment‘s privilege against self incrimination.178  Justice 
Souter asserted that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-




Despite the conservative opinion written by Justice Souter in Balsys, 
he has demonstrated consistent support for the liberal precedent that estab-
lished the Miranda warnings during the Warren Court era.
180
  In 2000, Jus-
  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 683. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 684. 
 173. Id. 68895; Stone, 428 U.S. at 49495. 
 174. 524 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 175. Id. at 669. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 670. 
 178. Id. at 669. 
 179. Id. at 698.  Souter notes that it is possible that the United States could apply the privilege against 
self-incrimination in cooperation with a foreign nation, but the legal argument of Balsys did not present 
a situation to justify such cooperation.  Id. 
 180. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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tice Souter voted with the seven-justice majority to reaffirm the basic prin-
ciples of Miranda v. Arizona
181
 by striking down the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol Act of 1968
182
 that had threatened to overturn Miranda.
183
  Four years 
later, Justice Souter continued to reaffirm his support for Miranda and the 
privilege against self-incrimination when he wrote for a liberal majority in 
Missouri v. Seibert.
184
  In Seibert, Justice Souter, writing for the five-
justice majority, held that a murder confession could be excluded because 
police had used a two-step strategy wherein officers would secure a con-
fession from a suspect without issuing Miranda warnings and then Miran-
da warnings would be issued to gain the confession a second time.
185  Jus-
tice Souter wrote that the ―midstream recitation of warnings after interro-
gation and unwarned confession could not effectively comply with Miran-
da‘s constitutional requirement.‖186  Furthermore, Justice Souter concluded 
that the purpose of the police tactic in question was ―to get a confession the 
suspect would not make if he understood his rights at the outset.‖187  He 
reasoned that Miranda warnings did not function effectively given the de-
ceptive nature of the police strategy which deprived the defendant of un-
derstanding his rights and understanding the ramifications of waiving such 
freedoms.
188
  During the same term as Siebert, Justice Souter expressed 
further support for Miranda when he dissented from the Court‘s five-
person majority in United States v. Patane.
189
  In Patane, the Court ruled 
that physical evidence secured by police does not necessarily have to be 
suppressed, even if it was discovered because of incriminating statements 
without the issuance of Miranda warnings.
190
  Justice Souter‘s dissenting 
opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, accused the majority 
  
 181. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 3501, invalidated by Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 44344.  Congress designed the legisla-
tion, which was officially titled The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, to overturn 
the precedent established in Miranda.  Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.  The Act co-existed with Miranda 
for thirty-four years until 2000, when the U.S. Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional.  Id. 
 183. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. 
 184. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 185. Id. at 605.  Souter was joined in his majority opinion by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  
Id. at 603.  While Justice Kennedy did not join Souter‘s opinion, he did file a concurring opinion in 
voting with the majority.  Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Kennedy argued that, while he agreed 
with a large part of Souter‘s opinion, the admission of the statements was appropriate if it furthered 
important goals without compromising the basic tenets of Miranda.  Id. at 619.  Hence, not every 
violation of Miranda should require a suppression of evidence secured by interrogators.  Id. at 618. 
 186. Siebert, 542 U.S. at 604. 
 187. Id. at 613. 
 188. Id. at 61314. 
 189. 542 U.S. 630, 645 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 644 (majority opinion).  The opinion of the Court, by Justice Thomas, indicates that a 
failure to issue Miranda warnings to a suspect does not by itself constitute a violation of a suspect‘s 
constitutional rights.  Id.  The Court remanded the case for further consideration based upon the proper 
interpretation of the Miranda rule.  Id. 
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justices of ―closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary 
advantage to those who ignore Miranda . . . .‖191  He added that the deci-




D. “Fair Trial” Rights 
By Justice Souter‘s second term on the Court, from 1991 to 1992, he 
had already begun to exhibit a liberal trend regarding criminal justice cas-
es.
193
  Justice Souter‘s first significant opinion regarding Sixth Amendment 
trial rights involved a five-to-four decision in Doggett v. United States.
194
  
In this case, the Court held that a convicted defendant had been denied his 
right to a speedy trial.
195
  Federal drug charges were brought against Marc 
Doggett in 1980, but before federal agents could arrest him, he left the 
United States for Panama.
196
  After leaving Panama for Colombia, Doggett 
returned to the United States in 1982 where he lived for six years before a 
credit check revealed an outstanding warrant for his arrest and he was ap-
prehended by the U.S. Marshal Service.
197
 
In Doggett, the Justices split five-to-four along ideological lines.
198
  
Justices Souter, White, Stevens, Kennedy, and Blackmun formed a liberal 
bloc ruling in favor of Doggett‘s Sixth Amendment rights, while Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O‘Connor, Scalia, and Thomas formed a 
conservative bloc in favor of the U.S. government‘s position.199   
In Justice Souter‘s majority opinion, he concluded that the eight-year 
lag between the indictment and arrest of Doggett was sufficient to raise the 
issue of whether Doggett had received a speedy trial under the Sixth 
Amendment.
200
  Justice Souter found that the U.S. government was negli-
gent in pursuing Doggett and the negligent delay between indictment and 
arrest hindered Doggett in preparing his legal defense.
201
  Justice Souter 
noted a lengthy delay before a trial might cause a number of unidentifiable 
  
 191. Id. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. 
 193. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 168. 
 194. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 648 (1992). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 649. 
 197. Id. at 650. 
 198. Id. at 648. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 652. 
 201. Id. at 653. 
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problems for a defendant in his attempt to secure a fair trial and that the 
delay itself caused a presumption of prejudice against the defendant.
202
  
Ten years after the Doggett ruling, Justice Souter wrote the first of two 
opinions in right-to-counsel cases that involved the interpretation of a fed-
eral rule.
203
  The cases considered Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, 
which details the process to be followed by a judge in ensuring that a guilty 
plea was understood and voluntarily accepted by a criminal defendant.
204
  
If the judge departs from this procedure, a guilty plea still might be upheld 
if the judge‘s actions did not violate any substantial rights of the defen-
dant.
205
  This type of judicial error is commonly known as ―harmless er-
ror.‖206  In Vonn, Alphonso Vonn had been charged with armed robbery 
and informed by a magistrate judge that he had a right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment.
207
  However, when Vonn entered a guilty plea at a later 
stage of the criminal proceedings, the court failed to convey to Vonn that 
he had a right to counsel.
208
  Justice Souter‘s opinion held that Vonn could 
not benefit from the error because he raised the issue of Rule 11 in a negli-
gent manner, after the trial court phase.
209
  Under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, if a defendant was negligent in raising a Rule 11 ob-
jection, the burden shifts from the government to the defendant, who must 
then establish that the error violated a substantial right.
210
 
Two years later Justice Souter relied upon the precedent established in 
Vonn to decide a similar case involving the application of Rule 11 in Unit-
ed States v. Dominguez Benitez.
211
  In this case, Justice Souter again wrote 
a unanimous opinion for the Court.  Carlos Dominguez Benitez pled guilty 
to conspiracy.
212
  Because the defendant had three prior convictions, the 
court rejected his plea agreement and he was sentenced to a mandatory ten-
year prison term and prevented from withdrawing his guilty plea.
213
  Beni-
tez raised a Rule 11 claim because he had not been informed by the court 
in advance of his plea that he would prevented from withdrawing it in the 
  
 202. Id. at 654.  A lengthy period of time between indictment and trial may cause problems for the 
defense because evidence might be lost, the memory of witnesses may fade, and persons associated 
with the case could disappear or die.  Id. 
 203. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 57 (2002). 
 204. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 205. Vonn, 535 U.S. at 62. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 60. 
 208. Id. at 60. 
 209. Id. at 63. 
 210. Id. at 73. 
 211. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 75 (2004). 
 212. Id. at 74. 
 213. Id. at 78. 
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event the court rejected the sentencing agreement.
214
  Relying upon the 
Vonn precedent, Justice Souter asserted in his opinion that, because the 
Rule 11 claim was not filed in a timely fashion, the defendant must demon-
strate that a different outcome in the trial would have occurred, if not for 
the error committed by the court.
215
 
In 2005, Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Rompilla v. 
Beard, which continued the Court‘s trend (since 2000) of ruling in favor of 
defendants in Sixth Amendment cases.
216
  In Rompilla, the majority opi-
nion written by Justice Souter for a divided Court focused upon the right to 
counsel for a criminal defendant who had been sentenced to death by the 
state of Pennsylvania for murder based upon a number of aggravating cir-
cumstances.
217
  One of the aggravating circumstances presented by prose-
cutors to justify the death sentence was Rompilla‘s history of felony con-
victions.
218
  Justice Souter held for the five-person majority that Rompilla‘s 
defense attorneys should have introduced mitigating factors concerning his 
various personal problems.
219
  For example, Rompilla had limited mental 
capacity, was a victim of child abuse, and also was diagnosed with fetal 
alcohol syndrome and schizophrenia.
220
  This mitigating evidence was not 
introduced by his legal counsel even though it had been introduced when 
Rompilla was convicted of felony rape almost a decade and a half earli-
er.
221
  Because Rompilla‘s counsel had not met the standard of reasonable 
competence established by the American Bar Association (ABA), Justice 
Souter concluded that Rompilla had received inadequate counsel.
222
  In 
overturning Rompilla‘s death sentence, Justice Souter quoted directly from 
the ABA standards when he wrote: 
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to 
facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event 
  
 214. Id. at 79. 
 215. Id. at 85. 
 216. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005).  Since 2000, the Supreme Court has voted in favor 
of defendants‘ Sixth Amendment rights in the following cases: Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 128 
S. Ct. 2578 (2008); Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008); Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 
(2007); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 
(2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blake-
ly v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Fellers v. United 
States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Massaro v. United States, 538 
U.S. 500 (2003); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); and 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 217. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 378. 
 218. Id. at 378. 
 219. Id. at 389. 
 220. Id. at 391. 
 221. Id. at 390. 
 222. Id. at 383. 
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of conviction.  The investigation should always include efforts to 
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law en-
forcement authorities.  The duty to investigate exists regardless of 
the accused‘s admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts con-
stituting guilt or the accused‘s stated desire to plead guilty.223  
In short, Rompilla‘s legal counsel failed because the introduction of 
the mitigating evidence from his prior rape conviction during the sentenc-
ing phase could have produced a different outcome.
224
  Because of the 
Court‘s decision in Rompilla, Pennsylvania was required to provide Rom-




In 2005, Justice Souter also wrote a majority opinion concerning the 
right to a fair trial and the issue of racial discrimination.
226
  Relying upon 
precedent from Batson v. Kentucky
227—where the Court ruled that prosecu-
tors could not use peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory man-
ner—Justice Souter wrote the Court‘s opinion in Miller-El v. Dretke.228  In 
Miller-El, the justices split by a six-to-three vote in ruling that the Dallas 
County District Attorney‘s Office had committed racial discrimination in 
issuing peremptory challenges of jurors in a capital murder case.
229
  Justice 
Souter led the majority in holding that the Dallas prosecutors had violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as Mil-
ler‘s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.230  Justice 
Souter wrote that ―[t]he prosecutors used their peremptory strikes to ex-
clude 91% of the eligible African-American venire members . . . .  Hap-
penstance is unlikely to produce this disparity.‖231  In Miller-El, Justice 
Souter aligned himself against Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, and 
joined a liberal bloc of justices concerned about the fair trial rights of a 
defendant amidst serious concerns about the racial composition of a jury.
232
  
Justice Souter‘s most recent opinion dealing with the Sixth Amend-
ment was written in Rothgery v. Gillespie County,
233
 which involved the 
legal question of whether a defendant should be guaranteed the right to 
  
 223. Id. at 387. 
 224. Id. at 393. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 235 (2005). 
 227. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 228. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252. 
 229. Id. at 235. 
 230. Id. at 266. 
 231. Id. at 241 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342 (2002)). 
 232. Id. at 235. 
 233. 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2008). 
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counsel at his initial proceeding before a magistrate judge.
234
  Rothgery had 
been denied appointed counsel at his initial proceeding where he learned 
that he would be charged—erroneously—as a felon in possession of a fire-
arm.
235
  After the initial hearing, Rothgery posted bond but was repeatedly 
denied appointed counsel because Gillespie County had an unwritten rule 
of denying free counsel to indigents out on bond until a prosecutor entered 
an indictment.
236
  When Rothgery was finally indicted by prosecutors and 
re-arrested, he was unable to post the increased bond amount and was re-
quired to spend three weeks in prison until, finally, appointed counsel was 
able to file the necessary paperwork to dismiss the indictment based upon 
the erroneous information used by police officers.
237
  Rothgery brought 
federal action against Gillespie County arguing that, if counsel had been 
appointed at the initial proceeding, a lawyer would have been able to prove 
that Rothgery was not a felon and his false arrest would have been dis-
missed earlier.
238
  Instead, because Rothgery was denied counsel until the 
indictment, he lost his freedom for three weeks.
239
 
Justice Souter‘s opinion for the eight-person majority held that Roth-
gery‘s initial appearance before a magistrate judge marked the onset of the 
adversarial process, and Gillespie County must respect the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel if a prosecutor attended the initial proceedings.
240
  
While Gillespie County had justified the denial of counsel based upon 
prosecutors not having been involved in the initial proceeding, Justice Sou-
ter stated that defendants were to be provided counsel even if prosecutors 
were not required to be made aware of or even involved with the initial 
proceeding.
241
  Citing case precedent from Michigan v. Jackson and Brew-
er v. Williams, Justice Souter noted that the Supreme Court has consistent-
ly recognized that ―the right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance 
before a judicial officer at which a defendant is told of the formal accusa-
tion against him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty.‖242 
  
 234. Id. at 258182. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 2591.  Texas law stipulated that police officers were required to bring Rothgery before the 
magistrate judge for a determination of probable cause, the setting of bail, and the formal appraisal of 
charges.  Id. at 258182.  The hearing is commonly referred to as an ―article 15.17 hearing.‖  Id. at 
2582. 
 242. Id. at 2579; see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (holding six-to-three that 
when police began an interrogation after a defendant‘s assertion at an arraignment of his right to coun-
sel, any waiver of the defendant‘s right to counsel for that interrogation was not valid); Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977) (holding five-to-four that a defendant‘s conviction for murder must 
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E. The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment 
As noted above, Justice Souter supported the use of the death penalty 
as Attorney General and as a state judge in New Hampshire.
243
  The first 
case for Justice Souter on the Supreme Court involving the death penalty 
was Payne v. Tennessee.
244
  In Payne, Justice Souter joined a conservative 
majority in a six-to-three vote that upheld the use of victim impact state-
ments during the sentencing phase of a death penalty case.
245
  Justice Sou-
ter authored a concurring opinion in Payne in which he argued that with-
holding victim impact statements would be unfair and provide an advan-
tage to the defendant.
246
  He further stated that ―[i]ndeed, given a defen-
dant‘s option to introduce relevant evidence in mitigation, sentencing 
without such evidence of victim impact may be seen as a significantly im-
balanced process.‖247 
Justice Souter, however, did part from the majority in his concurrence 
when he expressed concern that, while the Payne ruling had correctly over-
turned two precedents, the majority dismissed the precedent as grounded 
on ―administrative convenience.‖248  Whereas Justice Rehnquist‘s majority 
opinion and Justice Scalia‘s separate concurrence declined to emphasize 
the significance of precedent, Justice Souter‘s concurrence discussed the 
―fundamental importance‖ of stare decisis and the necessity of ―some ‗spe-
cial justification‘‖ supporting a departure from precedent.249  Hence, even 
in his first term on the Court, Justice Souter began to demonstrate a streak 
of independence from his conservative brethren that would grow even 
stronger in the coming years.
250
 
Justice Souter was assigned his initial opinion for the Court in the area 
of the death penalty in Sochor v. Florida.
251
  Sochor involved a death sen-
tence recommended by a jury that had been instructed to decide upon four 
aggravating factors, including such vague factors as heinousness and cold-
ness.
252
  While the jury recommendation did not indicate which aggravat-
ing factors existed, the judge found that all of the aggravating factors ex-
  
be overturned where the defendant led officers to the victim‘s body without the presence of defense 
counsel). 
 243. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 36. 
 244. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 810 (1991). 
 245. Id. at 810. 
 246. Id. at 839. 
 247. Id. (citations omitted). 
 248. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 164.  The two precedents overturned by the Court in Payne were 
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
 249. Payne, 501 U.S. at 842 (citations omitted). 
 250. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 162. 
 251. Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 531 (1992). 
 252. Id. at 52930. 
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isted and found no mitigating factors in handing down a death sentence.
253
  
Justice Souter‘s complex opinion for the Court held that the Supreme 
Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on Florida‘s ―heinousness‖ factor.254  
But Justice Souter‘s opinion did hold that the Florida Supreme Court 
committed an Eighth Amendment error because it did not possess enough 
evidence to uphold the ―coldness‖ factor and should have reviewed the 
judge‘s decision regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors in an 
independent fashion.
255
  Justice Souter‘s opinion for the Court resulted in a 
unanimous ruling on the jurisdictional issue related to the ―heinousness‖ 




Three years later, in Kyles v. Whitley, Justice Souter sided with the lib-
eral bloc in drafting a majority opinion ordering a new trial for a defendant 
who had been sentenced to death in Louisiana for first-degree murder.
257
  
Justice Souter‘s opinion—joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, 
and O‘Connor—concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new trial 
after a revelation that the state of Louisiana had withheld evidence that 
could have produced a favorable result for the defendant.
258
 
Justice Souter‘s most recent majority opinion in a capital punishment 
case was written in Kelly v. South Carolina.
259
  Again, Justice Souter sided 
with the same liberal bloc of justices from the Kyles decision in holding 
that the defendant was entitled to have the judge or legal counsel instruct 
the jury that the defendant would not be eligible for parole if he received a 
life sentence.
260
  Instead of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, 
the jury decided upon a death sentence for the defendant in the absence of 
such jury instruction.
261
  Justice Souter argued in his opinion that due 
process required the jurors to be informed through jury instructions by the 
judge or through arguments presented by legal counsel.
262
 
In the recent—and more publicized—cases involving the death penal-
ty, Justice Souter has consistently sided with the liberal bloc on the 
Court.
263
  In Atkins v. Virginia, Justice Souter voted with a liberal majority 
to prohibit the use of death penalty for the mentally challenged and, in Ro-
  
 253. Id. at 529. 
 254. Id. at 534. 
 255. Id. at 540. 
 256. See generally id. at 52951. 
 257. 514 U.S. 419, 42122 (1995). 
 258. Id. at 454. 
 259. 534 U.S. 246, 247 (2002). 
 260. Id. at 248. 
 261. Id. at 251. 
 262. Id. at 25657. 
 263. Robert Barnes, High Court Rejects Death For Child Rape: Penalty Reserved for Murder and 
Crimes Against State, WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at A1. 
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per v. Simmons, he voted to raise the minimum age for executions from 
sixteen to eighteen.
264
  As in the Kelly decision, Justice Souter opposed a 
conservative bloc of justices, namely Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, as the Court overturned precedents from the 1980s 
based on a growing national trend against such executions.
265
  Most recent-
ly, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice Souter voted with the liberal bloc in 
banning the execution of defendants who committed child rape.
266
 
Justice Souter established a liberal voting record in terms of capital 
punishment during his early years on the Court.
267
  More recently, Justice 
Souter has consistently voted to limit the application of the death penalty 
where due process rights have been violated, and to abolish the use of the 
death penalty in cases involving the mentally challenged, defendants under 
the age of eighteen,
268
 and defendants convicted of child rape.
269
  Hence, 
for the better part of his service on the Court, Justice Souter has voted 




F. The Eighth Amendment and Prisoners‟ Rights 
Justice Souter‘s opinions in terms of prisoners‘ rights and the Eighth 
Amendment also demonstrate an independent streak, although he has writ-
ten only four opinions in this area of law.
271
  Early in Justice Souter‘s ca-
reer on the Court, he wrote for a conservative majority in Rowland v. Cali-
fornia Men‟s Colony.272  In Rowland, Justice Souter was joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O‘Connor, and Scalia in holding that 
only natural persons may qualify as indigents in the filing of in forma pau-
peris petitions.
273
  The California Men‘s Colony was a representative asso-
ciation which served as an advisory council for the prison warden.
274
  The 
organization, comprised of prisoners, tried to file an in forma pauperis 
  
 264. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002). 
 265. Editorial, Death Penalty in Review: Capital Punishment Loses Ground, for Good Reasons, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2007, at B6.  The Court precedents overturned by Atkins and Roper were Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), which held that states could execute the mentally challenged, and 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), which held that states could execute defendants who 
were 16 years old or older, but not under 16 years old. 
 266. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2645 (2008). 
 267. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 586 tbl.12.2.  Souter voted in the liberal direction in ten of the 
eighteen capital punishment cases from 1991 to 1994.  Id. 
 268. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646; Roper, 543 U.S. at 577; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 269. Barnes, supra note 263, at A1. 
 270. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 586. 
 271. Id. at 162. 
 272. 506 U.S. 194, 196 (1993). 
 273. Id. at 194. 
 274. Id. at 196. 
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petition in federal court claiming that the California Department of Correc-
tions violated its right against cruel and unusual punishment.
275
  In decid-
ing against the California Men‘s Colony, Justice Souter held that only nat-
ural persons as defined by the plain meaning of a federal law could file suit 
in federal court as indigents, and the organization itself did not constitute a 
person under federal law.
276
 
In the following term, Justice Souter wrote another opinion on the top-
ic of prisoners‘ rights in Farmer v. Brennan.277  This opinion is a signifi-
cant ruling because it has become controlling precedent in the area of in-
mate-on-inmate rape as well as sexual misconduct by prison officials 
against inmates.
278
  In Farmer, Justice Souter wrote an opinion for the 
Court where he created a two-part test to determine whether a prisoner‘s 
right against cruel and unusual punishment had been violated.
279
  The first 
part of the test requires that a prisoner show that an injury was objectively 
serious; the second part requires proof that prison officials are culpable 
based on deliberate indifference to an inmate‘s safety.280  The circums-
tances surrounding this case involved a transvestite prisoner who was 
transferred to a more violent prison and placed in the general population 
where a sexual assault of the prisoner occurred.
281
  The prisoner claimed 
that prisoner officials deliberately ordered the transfer with knowledge that 
such an assault would take place.
282
  In light of the two-part test created by 
Justice Souter, the district court was ordered to reconsider its denial of the 
discovery motion requested by the prisoner as well as the allegations 
against the prison officials.
283
 
In Booth v. Churner, Justice Souter again wrote for a unanimous 
Court.
284
  The opinion held that under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995, a prisoner was required to exhaust the administrative remedies 
available before filing a civil lawsuit in federal court over prison condi-
tions.
285
  In other words, the administrative process must be completed 
before a prisoner can sue for monetary damages in federal court.
286
  Justice 
  
 275. Id. at 19697. 
 276. Id. at 21112. 
 277. 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 834. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 830. 
 282. Id. at 831. 
 283. Id. at 850. 
 284. 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001). 
 285. Id. at 734. 
 286. Id. 
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Souter‘s technical opinion centered upon the broad statutory intent of Con-
gress in defining the words ―administrative remedies‖ and ―available.‖287  
Justice Souter‘s most recent opinion dealing with prisoners‘ rights and 
the Eighth Amendment was Roell v. Withrow.
288
  In Roell, Justice Souter 
wrote for a five-person majority in favor of a prisoner who filed a federal 
lawsuit maintaining that prison officials had ignored his medical needs in 
violation of his right against cruel and unusual punishment.
289
  The main 
issue concerned whether prison officials consented to have the case heard 
before a federal magistrate instead of a district court judge.
290
  After the 
federal magistrate ruled in favor of the prisoner, prison officials objected 
and argued that the dispute should have been heard by a federal district 
court judge.
291
  Justice Souter‘s opinion held that because the prison offi-
cials had participated in the entire litigation process without objecting, it 
could be inferred that the prison officials had consented to the case being 
heard by the federal magistrate.
292
 
VI.  IDEOLOGICAL VOTING BEHAVIOR (1991–2008) 
As with Justice Souter‘s written opinions discussed above, an empiri-
cal analysis of individual votes cast by Justice Souter from 1991 to 2008 
also reveals a shift toward liberalism on issues related to criminal justice, 
namely in Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment cases.
293
  In the first 
column of Table 1 below, Justice Souter‘s ideological voting behavior dur-
ing his early years on the Court (1991–1997) has been displayed, while the 
second column of Table 1 has documented Justice Souter‘s shift toward 
liberal voting over the last decade (1998–2008).294  Finally, the third col-
umn in Table 1 provides a comprehensive summary of Justice Souter‘s 
ideological voting from 1991 to 2008.
295
 
While Justice Souter began as a conservative in Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure cases, he has deviated from the conservative bloc fre-
quently in recent years.
296
  According to Table 1, Justice Souter‘s voting 
  
 287. Id. at 736; see also Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996). 
 288. 538 U.S. 580, 582 (2003). 
 289. Id. at 582. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 583. 
 292. Id. at 591. 
 293. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 449–51, 496–99, 538–43, 586–88 (showing the individual 
votes of Justice David Souter); see generally HAROLD J. SPAETH, MICHIGAN STATE UNIV., U.S. 
SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE, 1953–1997 TERMS (1998). 
 294. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 449–51, 496–99, 538–43, 586–88. 
 295. Id. 
 296. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 234; see also Johnson, supra note 122. 
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behavior was solidly conservative in search and seizure cases from 1991 to 
1997.
297
  During these initial years on the Court, Justice Souter voted 62% 
in the conservative direction—or against the rights of criminal defen-
dants—and sided with the liberal position only 38% of the time.298  How-
ever, from 1998 to 2008, a complete reversal occurred as Justice Souter 
voted 61% for the liberal position while voting conservatively only 39% in 
search and seizure cases.
299
  According to Table 1, in search and seizure 
cases from 1991 to 2008, Justice Souter cast slightly more than half of his 
overall votes for the liberal position.
300
  In sum, Justice Souter can best be 
characterized as moderately liberal in search and seizure cases; his flexibil-





 297. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 44951. 
 298. Justice Souter cast sixteen votes in search and seizure cases from 1991 to 1997.  In the following 
ten cases, Justice Souter voted against the Fourth Amendment rights of the criminal defendants: Mary-
land v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806 (1996); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 
(1993); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Florida 
v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991); and Califor-
nia v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
  In the following six cases, Justice Souter voted in favor of the Fourth Amendment rights of 
criminal defendants: Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 
(1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 
(1995); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993); and Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56 
(1992). 
 299. Justice Souter cast thirty-nine votes from 1998 to 2008 in search and seizure cases.  In the fol-
lowing twenty-four cases, Justice Souter voted in favor of the Fourth Amendment rights of criminal 
defendants: Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006); Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 
U.S. 551 (2004); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003); Bd. of 
Educ. of Indep. School Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 
194 (2002); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Florida v. 
JL, 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 
(1999); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Knowles 
v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); Pennsylvania v. Scott, 524 
U.S. 357 (1998); and Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998). 
  In the following fifteen cases, Justice Souter voted against the Fourth Amendment rights of 
criminal suspects: Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 
398 (2006); United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005); 
Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004); United States 
v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); United States v. 
Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112 (2001); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 
U.S. 326 (2001); Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); and United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 
(1998). 
 300. See supra note 299. 
 301. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 77; YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 234. 
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In Fifth Amendment cases, Justice Souter demonstrated a pattern of 
voting conservatively during his early years on the Court.
302
  From 1991 to 
1997, Justice Souter voted 55% in the conservative direction and 45% for 
the liberal side in cases pertaining to the privilege against self-
incrimination, double jeopardy, and due process claims.
303
  However, be-
tween 1998 and 2008, Justice Souter dramatically reversed this earlier pat-
tern by increasing his liberal voting percentage for the rights of criminal 
suspects to 72%—thus decreasing his conservative percentage to 28%—in 
Fifth Amendment disputes.
304
  Overall, Justice Souter‘s entire record be-
tween 1991 and 2008 in Fifth Amendment cases includes 65% of votes 




In Sixth Amendment cases involving the trial rights of criminal defen-
dants, Justice Souter again exhibited the same pattern he has shown in 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases.
306
  Between 1991 and 1997, Justice 
Souter voted nearly two-thirds of the time in the conservative direction in 
  
 302. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 496.  Hensley reported that Justice Souter voted conservatively 
in 71% of Fifth Amendment cases from 1991 to 1994.  Id.  Justice Souter participated in seven cases 
involving the Fifth Amendment during this time period.  Id. 
 303. Justice Souter cast eleven votes from 1991 to 1997, of which the following six were conserva-
tive: Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996); Unit-
ed States v. Davis, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994); United States v. Felix, 
503 U.S. 378 (1992); and Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
  In the following five cases, from 1991 to 1997, Justice Souter voted liberal: Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Bennis v. Michigan, 517 U.S. 1163 (1996); Dep‘t of Revenue v. Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); and Withrow v. Williams, 
507 U.S. 680 (1993). 
 304. Justice Souter voted in twenty-nine cases involving Fifth Amendment rights from 1998 to 2008.  
He voted liberal in the following twenty-one cases: Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005); Smith v. 
Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Missouri v. Seibert, 
542 U.S. 600 (2004); Yarbrough v. Alavardo, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 
(2004); Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); DeMore 
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 
U.S. 101 (2003); McKune v. Illinois, 536 U.S. 24 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 
(2001); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000); 
Nelson v. Adams USA, 529 U.S. 460 (2000); Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000); Mitchell v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998); E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 
524 U.S. 498 (1998); and Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998). 
  In the following eight cases, between 1998 and 2008, Justice Souter voted conservatively: Wil-
kie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 
84 (2003); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999); 
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998); 
and Ohio v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272 (1998). 
 305. See supra note 304. 
 306. Sixth Amendment trial rights include the right to counsel, right to a jury trial, right to a speedy 
and public trial, the right to confront witnesses, the right of criminal defendants to subpoena witnesses, 
and the right to be informed of charges.  See generally FRANCIS HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1951); see also ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1992). 
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Sixth Amendment cases, while registering a liberal percentage of only 36% 
during the same timeframe.
307
  But Justice Souter‘s voting record again 
changed significantly between 1998 and 2008, when he recorded a liberal 
rating of 70%, with only 30% of his votes cast in favor of the govern-
ment‘s position.308  Overall, Justice Souter can be categorized as a fairly 
liberal justice in Sixth Amendment cases, having voted for the trial rights 




In criminal justice cases, Justice Souter‘s voting record is at its most 
liberal in Eighth Amendment cases concerning the death penalty and pris-
oners‘ rights.310  Unlike the earlier stages of the criminal justice process 
involving the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, Table 1 depicts Justice 
Souter as consistently liberal through time in Eighth Amendment cases.
311
  
Even in his earlier years on the Court, Justice Souter voted a majority of 
the time with the liberal bloc,
312
 and, in the last decade, he voted in favor of 
  
 307. From 1991 to 1997, Justice Souter participated in fourteen cases involving Sixth Amendment 
rights.  Justice Souter voted in the liberal direction in the following five cases: Victor v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1 (1994); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 
(1992); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); and Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991). 
  In the following nine cases, Justice Souter voted conservatively: Lewis v. United States, 518 
U.S. 322 (1996); Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 
738 (1994); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Estelle 
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Mu‘Min v. Virginia, 500 
U.S. 415 (1991); and Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991). 
 308. Justice Souter voted in thirty-three Sixth Amendment cases from 1998 to 2008.  Justice Souter 
voted in the liberal direction in the following twenty-three decisions: Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 
Tex., 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008); Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008); Rita v. United States, 127 S. 
Ct. 2456 (2007); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 
374 (2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Fellers v. 
United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Massaro v. United States, 
538 U.S. 500 (2003); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); Texas v. 
Cobb, 536 U.S. 162 (2001); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362 (2000); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S.185 (1998). 
  In the following nine cases, Justice Souter voted in favor of the conservative side: Wright v. Van 
Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743 (2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 
175 (2004); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 
74 (2004); Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002); United 
States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000); Martinez v. California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000); and 
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998). 
 309. See supra note 308. 
 310. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 238. 
 311. Id. at 25556 (noting that Souter voted more conservatively in Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ment cases than in Eighth Amendment cases from 1991 to 2005); see also Johnson, supra note 122 
(providing a descriptive analysis of Souter‘s voting record in criminal cases from 1991 to 2007). 
 312. From 1991 to 1997, Justice Souter participated in twenty cases that dealt with the Eighth 
Amendment.  Justice Souter cast a liberal vote in the following eleven cases: Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419 (1995); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 
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Table 1: Ideological Voting Record of Justice Souter in Criminal Jus-
tice Cases, 1991–2008 
Conservative–Liberal Votes (% Conservative) 
Amendment: 4th 5th 6th 8th 
1991–1997: 10–6 (63%) 6–5 (55%) 9–5 (64%) 9–11 (45%) 
1998–2008: 15–24 (38%) 8–21 (28%) 10–23 (30%) 8–24 (25%) 
Total: 25–30 (45%) 14–26 (35%) 19–28 (40%) 17–35 (33%) 
 
VII.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Justice David Souter‘s written opinions and voting behavior in crimi-
nal justice cases have highlighted two trends.
314
  Justice Souter has evolved 
  
(1994); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Helling 
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 56 (1992); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 
U.S. 719 (1992); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); and 
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991). 
  During this same time period, Justice Souter handed down nine conservative votes in the follow-
ing Eighth Amendment disputes: Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 
U.S. 967 (1994); Farmer v Brennan, 511 U.S.825 (1994); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993); Row-
land v. Cal. Men‘s Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); and Lankford v. Idaho, 500 
U.S. 110 (1991). 
 313. From 1998 to 2008, Justice Souter participated in thirty-two cases involving Eighth Amendment 
issues.  In the following twenty-four cases, Justice Souter voted in the liberal direction: Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008); Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 
1346 (2008); Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007); 
Panetti v. Quatermann, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007); Erikson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007); Abdul-Kabir 
v. Quartermann, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006); Brown v. Payton, 544 
U.S. 133 (2005); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 27 (2004); Schiro 
v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 
U.S. 637 (2004); Rowell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Kelly v. South Caroli-
na, 534 U.S. 246 (2002); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 
(2001); Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000); and United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 
(1998). 
  From 1998 to 2008, Justice Souter cast eight conservative votes in the following Eighth 
Amendment cases: Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006); Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517 (2006); 
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 
U.S. 731 (2001); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998); 
and Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998). 
 314. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 417 (discussing the Court‘s historical trend of providing 
for protection for defendants at the latter stages of the criminal justice process); Ramesh Ponnuru, 
Empty Souter—Supreme Court Justice David Souter, NAT‘L REV., Sept. 11, 1995, available at 
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from a conservative state judge and Supreme Court justice—who initially 
voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas—into a 
jurist who currently aligns more frequently with the liberal bloc comprised 
of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
315
  Interestingly, Justice Souter 
was nominated by President George H. W. Bush with the expectation that 
he would provide another conservative vote on a Court in the midst of a 
conservative counterrevolution.
316
  In fact, right-wing observers of the 
Court were told by John Sununu, White House Chief of Staff for George 
H. W. Bush between 1989 and 1991, that Justice Souter would be a ―home-
run‖ for conservatives.317  However, legal scholars have recognized that 
Justice Souter has practiced moderate pragmatism on the Court and has 
directly challenged conservative justices, such as Justice Scalia, in intellec-
tual debate.
318
  Secondly, Justice David Souter appears to have followed 
the approach demonstrated by the Court throughout the twentieth century 
of providing more protection for defendants at the later stages of the crimi-
nal justice process.
319
  Justice Souter apparently has been more concerned 
about the power of government brought to bear upon a defendant as he or 




In sum, the two trends displayed by Justice Souter suggest a moderate-
ly liberal justice who has favored a measured and balanced approach in his 
opinion writing and voting behavior in criminal justice cases.
321
  The fol-
lowing sections provide a review of Justice Souter‘s written opinions and 
voting behavior which clearly evidence the two trends discussed above.
322
 
A. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Cases 
In search and seizure cases, Justice Souter‘s opinions for the Court in 
Atwater and Banks, as well as his overall voting record, illustrate his con-
servatism in siding with law enforcement, particularly during his initial 
years on the Court.
323
  Justice Souter has been more conservative in search 
and seizure cases than in any other area of criminal justice, which high-
  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_n17_v47/ai_17374429 (discussing Justice Souter‘s shift 
from the conservative end toward the liberal end of the ideological spectrum). 
 315. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 449, 496, 538. 
 316. Id. at 12. 
 317. See Garrow, supra note 33, at 64. 
 318. Id. 
 319. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 417. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See Johnson, supra note 122. 
 322. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 417. 
 323. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S.318, 323 
(2001). 
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lights the historical trend of limiting the rights of individuals during the 
earlier stages of the criminal justice process.
324
  However, Justice Souter 
has recently developed an independent streak, particularly with his written 
opinion in Randolph and liberal votes in such landmark cases as Edmond 
and Lidster as well as the drug testing cases.
325
  Hence, Justice Souter‘s 
behavior can best be characterized as moderately liberal in the area of 
search and seizure with a more liberal pattern of siding with the rights of 
criminal defendants during his last ten years on the Court.
326
 
B. Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment Rights 
In contrast to Justice Souter‘s behavior in search and seizure cases, he 
has demonstrated a stronger pattern of liberalism by providing more pro-
tection for the rights of defendants during the latter stages of the criminal 
justice process.
327
  In regard to Fifth Amendment rights, Justice Souter has 
expressed strong support for the privilege against self-incrimination with 
his opinions in Withrow and Seibert and has wholeheartedly supported the 
Miranda precedent with his votes in such cases as Patane and Dicker-
son.
328
  As displayed in Table 1, Justice Souter‘s overall voting record in 
Fifth Amendment cases (65% in favor of criminal defendants) has been 




In terms of trial rights for defendants, Justice Souter has lived up to his 
reputation as a ―pro-fair-trial‖ judge developed during his years as a state 
court judge in New Hampshire.
330
  Justice Souter‘s opinions for the Court 
in Doggett, Rompilla, and Miller-el caused sharp ideological divisions as 
he represented liberal majorities in each case.
331
  These opinions are con-
sistent with Justice Souter‘s recent shift toward liberalism in Sixth 
Amendment cases as he voted 70% of the time in favor of defendants‘ 
rights from 1998 to 2008.
332
  This contrasts sharply with the fact that Jus-
  
 324. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 417. 
 325. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 105 (2006); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 420 
(2004); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32, 33 (2000); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 647 (1995). 
 326. See generally YARBROUGH, supra note 8. 
 327. Johnson, supra note 122. 
 328. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); 
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 645 (2004). 
 329. See supra notes 303, 304, 307, 308 (listing all of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment cases partici-
pated in by Justice Souter). 
 330. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 55. 
 331. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 648 (1992); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 
(2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 235 (2005). 
 332. See Table 1 supra. 
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tice Souter voted as a solid conservative between 1991 and 1997.
333
  Al-
though Justice Souter did author two opinions with conservative outcomes 
involving trial rights (in Vonn and Dominguez Benitez), these cases were 
less controversial because the opinions were unanimous.
334
 
Finally, Justice Souter has reserved his strongest support for defen-
dants for the final stage of the criminal justice process.
335
  With the excep-
tion of a few cases handed down during his earlier terms on the Court—
such as Payne and Rowland—Justice Souter‘s written opinions and voting 
record have consistently favored the rights of convicted criminals in Eighth 
Amendment cases involving capital punishment and prisoners‘ rights.336  In 
fact, Justice Souter sided with criminal defendants in Eighth Amendment 
cases even during his early terms on the Court, from 1991 to 1997—a pe-
riod which saw him vote more frequently with the conservative bloc in all 
other areas of criminal justice.
337
  While Justice Souter may have supported 
tough sentences for criminal defendants and the use of the death penalty as 
a state attorney general and state judge, he clearly has rejected the ultra-




In the end, Justice Souter has not behaved as an ideological conserva-
tive.
339
  Instead, he has continued a streak of independence that began dur-
ing his years as a state judge and which garnered him praise from liberals 
and conservatives in his home state.
340
  In the area of criminal justice, Jus-
tice Souter‘s behavior of distributing justice based upon a more practical 
and flexible interpretation of the law has earned him the respect of legal 
scholars, but has disappointed right-wing groups that had hoped for anoth-
er conservative vote in the tradition of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
  
 333. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 538. 
 334. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 57 (2002); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 
74, 75 (2004). 
 335. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 586.  Hensley‘s book documented ten of eighteen votes (56%) 
by Justice Souter in the liberal direction in Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment cases between 
1991 and 1994.  Id. at 586 tbl.12.2. 
 336. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 810 (1991); Rowland v. Cal. Men‘s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 
196 (1993).  For an example of the impact of Justice Souter‘s liberal behavior regarding the Eighth 
Amendment, see Charles Lane, 5-4 Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile Executions, WASH. POST, Mar. 
2, 2005, at A1. 
 337. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 586; Table 1 supra. 
 338. See YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 5559; see also CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, 
THE REAL CLARENCE THOMAS: CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY (2000); 
Christopher E. Smith & Scott Patrick Johnson, The First-term Performance of Justice Clarence Tho-
mas, 76 JUDICATURE 172, 17278 (1993) (offering evidence of Justice Clarence Thomas‘s conservat-
ism); Richard A. Brisbin, The Conservatism of Antonin Scalia, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 1 (1990) (offering 
evidence of Justice Antonin Scalia‘s conservative behavior). 
 339. See generally Garrow, supra note 33. 
 340. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 76. 
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Thomas.
341
  Justice Souter‘s impact in the area of criminal justice cannot 
be understated and can be summed up best by Linda Greenhouse, a Pulitz-
er-Prize-winning reporter for The New York Times, who was quoted as 
saying that Justice Souter‘s evolution toward the liberal end of the ideolog-
ical spectrum ―[i]s probably as responsible as any single factor for the fail-
ure of the conservative revolution.‖342 
  
 341. See generally Garrow, supra note 33. 
 342. Id. at 64. 
